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More than a month has passed since the conclusion of the high-level conference on the
future of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held at Brighton, England—the
third such gathering devoted to overhauling the Strasbourg supervisory system in
response to the crushing backlog of pending applications and the structural human
rights problems that are their root cause. Unlike the conferences in Interlaken and
Izmir, however, the delegates in Brighton gathered under a cloud of vociferous protests
against the Court by the public and government officials in the United Kingdom.
According to a 2011 poll, a majority of voters believe that the UK government should
withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights—a view likely stoked by
incendiary statements such as Prime Minister David Cameron’s exclamation that
implementing an ECtHR judgment recognizing prisoners’ right to vote “makes me feel
sick.”
A pervasive air of backlash against the Court suffused the lead up to the Brighton
Conference. Whereas previous reform proposals stressed the need to strengthen the
regional human rights system, ECtHR watchers were shocked that a draft of the
Brighton Declaration—leaked to the public in late February 2012—contained a blueprint
for clipping the Strasbourg Court’s wings and weakening supranational review of
member states’ human rights practices. The final text is anodyne in comparison, and
most observers are breathing a collective sigh of relief that the outcome of the
conference was not as bad as they had initially feared.
The Brighton Declaration is, however, a watershed—or, perhaps more accurately, a low
water mark—in at least one important respect. It directs the Committee of Ministers to
prepare the text of a new Protocol to the Convention. If approved, the Protocol will be
the first amendment in the nearly sixty-year history of the Council of Europe’s human
rights system to include provisions that restrict rather than enhance the authority and
discretion of ECtHR judges.

In this brief commentary, I first review the Brighton Declaration provisions that reflect the
member states’ attempt to rein in the power of Strasbourg judges. I then introduce and
defend a proposal to condition access to the new Protocol’s “benefits” to those member
states that are adequately shouldering the “burdens” of more deeply embedding the
Convention and ECtHR case law in their national legal orders. I conclude by identifying
alternative ways to implement this proposal and discuss their potential benefits and
drawbacks.
* * * * * * *
The Brighton Declaration is divided into seven substantive sections. Three sections—
implementation of the Convention at national level; processing of applications; and
execution of judgments of the Court—correspond to what the Council of Europe has
labeled the upstream, midstream, and downstream causes of the ECtHR’s docket crisis.
The remaining four sections address the interaction between the Court and national
authorities; applications to the Court; judges and jurisprudence of the Court; and the
longer-term future of the Convention system. The proposals to amend the Convention
to restrict the ECtHR’s authority appear in these latter provisions. They include:





adding to the Convention’s preamble express references to the principle of
subsidiarity and to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation—references that many
observers view as a signal to the ECtHR to give greater deference to member states
(¶12.b);
eliminating, from the “significant disadvantage” ground for declaring an application
inadmissible, the safeguard clause that permits the ECtHR to review the application
if it “has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal” (¶15.c);
removing the parties’ ability to object to a Chamber’s decision to relinquish a case to
the Grand Chamber, a venue viewed as more sympathetic to national governments
(¶25.d).

Supplementing these “hard law” provisions are several nonbinding statements that, with
varying degrees of subtly, suggest that the ECtHR should rein in its scrutiny of national
governments:





an assertion that “the role of the Court is to review whether decisions taken by
national authorities are compatible with the Convention, having due regard to the
State’s margin of appreciation” (¶11);
a recommendation that the ECtHR “take a strict and consistent approach” to
declaring inadmissible complaints that have “been duly considered by a domestic
court applying the rights guaranteed by the Convention in light of well-established
case law of the Court including on the margin of appreciation” (¶15.d);
an invitation to the Court “to have regard to the importance of consistency where
judgments relate to aspects of the same issue, so as to ensure their cumulative
effect continues to afford States Parties an appropriate margin of appreciation”
(¶25.c); and
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a timetable for the Committee of Ministers to determine whether existing reforms
have “proven to be sufficient to assure sustainable functioning” of the ECtHR, or
whether “more profound changes are necessary” (¶34).

To be fair, the Brighton Declaration also reaffirms member states’ “deep and abiding
commitment” to the Convention, its institutions, and the right of individual petition (¶¶12). In addition, member states recognize their responsibility to ensure the effective
domestic implementation of the Convention and to abide by ECtHR judgments against
them (¶¶3-4). The opening paragraph of the section on “implementation of the
Convention at national level” makes this point succinctly and forcefully:
All laws and policies should be formulated, and all State officials should
discharge their responsibilities, in a way that gives full effect to the
Convention. States Parties must also provide means by which remedies
may be sought for alleged violations of the Convention. National courts
and tribunals should take into account the Convention and the case law of
the Court (¶7).
The Declaration then lists the “specific measures” to achieve the objectives in this
paragraph. These measures include establishing independent national human rights
institutions; authorizing parliaments to review the Convention-compatibility of draft
legislation; introducing new legal remedies; encouraging courts to take the Convention
and ECtHR case law into account; facilitating litigants’ ability to raise Convention
violations; and training and informing officials at all levels of government about the
Convention’s requirements (¶9.c).
It bears emphasizing, however, that these commitment to domestic implementation are
couched in hortatory, aspirational language. States “should” take these steps. They will
“consider” these measures “so far as relevant” and will “encourage” their adoption (¶¶7,
9.c). None of these pledges will be part of the new Protocol that the Declaration
contemplates. This creates a structural imbalance in the proposal to amend the
Convention. A binding international instrument will give member states the “benefits” of
the Brighton Declaration—dismissal of more applications and more deferential review of
those considered on the merits—without a corresponding obligation to shoulder the
“burdens” of fully implementing the Convention and ECtHR jurisprudence in national
legal systems.
* * * * * * *
To forestall this imbalance, I propose that the envisaged new Protocol require member
states to embed the Convention and ECtHR case law more firmly in their respective
domestic legal orders. Such a proposal is—with the notable exception of the recent
backlash against the Strasbourg Court in the UK—the next logical step in a decadeslong evolution of the European human rights system.
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Over the last quarter century, a growing number of countries have incorporated the
Convention into domestic law. As the Strasbourg system matured, the percentage of
incorporating countries increased such that by 2004 the treaty had “become an integral
part of the domestic legal orders of all states parties.” A more rapid shift has occurred
with respect to the ability of national courts to reopen judicial proceedings following
adverse ECtHR judgments. In 2000, the Committee of Ministers launched a campaign
urging governments to authorize this remedy. By 2006, reopened proceedings were
available in criminal cases in 80% of member states, and in civil and administrative
cases in approximately half of those states. Procedures to verify the Conventioncompatibility of draft legislation and administrative regulations are another area of rapid
progress encouraged by the Committee of Ministers. Such procedures now exist in
various forms in all member countries.
The domestic implementation clauses of the Brighton Declaration, summarized above,
reinforce these efforts. Taken together, these recommendations—and governments’
generally favorable responses to them—create an acquis of best practices for how to
more firmly embed the Convention and ECtHR judgments in national legal orders. The
ultimate goal of this process, as I have previously argued, is for national decisionmakers to acquire the authority and capacity to serve as first-line defenders and
remediators of human rights violations in Europe, with the ECtHR serving as a backstop
where national actors fail to carry out these functions.
Although member states have made significant strides toward this goal over the last
decade, the progress has been uneven. This is especially true for the endemic
structural human rights problems in a handful of countries that generate numerous
applications to Strasbourg. Well-known examples include excessively lengthy judicial
proceedings in Italy; executive meddling in final court judgments in the Ukraine;
disappearances in the Kurdish regions of Turkey; and discrimination against Roma
communities in several Eastern European countries. The result is marked and growing
geographic imbalance in the ECtHR’s case load. At the end of 2011, just five of 47
member states—Italy, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and the Ukraine—accounted for more
than 61% of all applications to the Court, with Russia alone the source of more than
26% of all complaints. Adding the next five states increased the proportion to 78%.
The reason for these disparities, as Helen Keller and her coauthors explain in an
insightful 2011 journal article, is that “the systems of judicial relief in these countries are
particularly problematic . . . owing to structural problems affecting the efficiency of the
judicial work or to deficiencies concerning respect for the principle of the rule of law.”
The disproportionate percentage of applications from this small group of countries
highlights the need to disaggregate proposals for greater subsidiarity and a wider
margin of appreciation from “the principle of equal treatment of all States Parties,” which
the Brighton Declaration reaffirms (¶20.c). Nonbinding pledges to improve domestic
implementation of the Convention and to speed compliance with ECtHR judgments—
and the financial and technical assistance from the Council of Europe that facilitate
them—are well and good. But they are no longer sufficient. If a new treaty is required
to meet the crisis that the Strasbourg system now faces, that instrument should include
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specific and binding commitments to more securely anchor the Convention and ECtHR
judgments in national legal orders. In addition, and more crucially, the Protocol should
make compliance with those commitments a condition of applying the narrower
admissibility rules and more deferential judicial review standards that the Brighton
Declaration contemplates.
* * * * * * *
Although my proposal to reform the ECtHR will likely be controversial, there are several
reasons to think that it may be politically feasible. First, the acquis of best practices on
embeddedness that has built up over the last decade has strong support from the
member states, acting on their own and through recommendations of the Council of
Europe adopted by consensus. Second, the three recent high-level conferences on the
ECtHR’s future have reaffirmed the basic elements of the acquis that would comprise
the Protocol’s “burdens.” Third, the amendment could be structured to give states a
modicum of flexibility regarding embeddedness. For example, it could include a phasein clause to give governments additional time to adjust their laws and practices, or. Or it
could allow states to accept different packages of commitments, an approach used by
the European Social Charter. Such a procedure would be especially useful for states
that oppose specific implementation measures, such as reopening judgments in civil
cases. Finally, the Protocol would not single out countries based on how many
applications are pending against them, either in absolute or relative terms. Rather, it
would provide a template to assess whether any ratifying state had adopted the
implementation measures that the amendment requires.
Assuming that the political will exists for such a proposal, how might it be implemented?
An important initial issue relates to the new Protocol’s entry-into-force rules. Previous
systemic overhauls of the European human rights system—such as Protocol No. 11,
which established a permanent Court, and Protocol No. 14, which authorized single
judges and three-judge committees to dismiss inadmissible applications—have required
ratification by all member states. More modest reforms, such as Protocol No. 9, which
gave private litigants a right to appeal to the ECtHR the reports of the erstwhile
European Commission, could be adopted on a country by country basis. The new
amendment falls somewhere in between these two extremes.
If the drafters choose an opt-in approach, each member of the Council of Europe would
confront a “package deal” treaty that includes both the burdens and the benefits of the
Brighton Declaration. A state could eschew this deal altogether. Such a country would
continue to be governed by existing admissibility rules and supranational review
standards. But it would avoid the Protocol’s hard law obligation to implement the
Convention domestically. (The nonbinding recommendations of the high-level
conferences would retain their persuasive authority.) Conversely, a state that ratified
the Protocol would be subject to its narrower admissibility requirements and more
deferential review standards. It would, however, also undertake a binding commitment
to embed the Convention and ECtHR judgments in national law.
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An opt-in Protocol must also include a mechanism to ensure that ratifying states adhere
to this bargain. If the Protocol’s embeddedness obligations will be effective
immediately, the drafters could create a preclearance procedure by which a new or
existing Council of Europe body would determine whether a state has implemented the
necessary measures. A green light from that body would be a prerequisite to
ratification. As an alternative or in addition, the drafters could establish a mechanism to
review compliance after ratification. Such a mechanism might be designed in a variety
of ways. States could submit periodic reports to a Council of Europe body to
demonstrate their compliance. Or the ECtHR could make such an assessment, either
on its own authority or in response to a complaint by a private litigant or another state.
Finally, the Protocol would also need a suspension clause to identify the conditions
under which a country that falls out of compliance with its embeddedness obligations
would lose some or all of the benefits of the amendment’s more sovereignty-friendly
admissibility rules and review standards.
One possible downside of an opt-in approach is that it would not do enough to reduce
the ECtHR’s backlog of cases. This might occur if several of the ten member states that
generate most applications to the Court decided not to ratify the amendment. In that
event, the Protocol might curb the number of politically controversial judgments that the
ECtHR issues against states with comparatively good records of protecting civil and
political liberties, but have limited impact in reducing complaints from countries with
enduring, structural human rights problems.
How might the process differ if all 47 member states were required to ratify the Protocol
to bring it into force? In that event, countries in which the Convention or ECtHR
judgments are less deeply embedded may seek to water down the Protocol’s
implementation rules or the mechanisms for reviewing compliance with them. The
result is likely to be a weaker legal instrument than would be agreed to under an opt-in
scenario. In addition, the prospect of region-wide ratification would likely require more
extensive negotiations, postponing the adoption of the final text. A further delay of
several years would follow as each country proceeded through its domestic ratification
process. Once the amendment was in force, however, it would avoid the potential
legitimacy concerns raised by applying different admissibility rules and judicial review
standards to different member states. There would also be modest efficiency gains for
ECtHR judges and Registry lawyers from applying a uniform set of procedures.
Whichever design strategy is adopted, what is essential is to link the burdens and
benefits of Brighton in a single legal instrument. Doing so would create a positive
incentive for member states to bolster national systems of human rights protection and,
ultimately, to take primary responsibility for preventing and remedying the vast majority
of violations of civil and political liberties. The judges in Strasbourg could then
concentrate their considerable legal talents on monitoring the proper functioning of
those national systems, stepping into the breach where those systems falter, and
ensuring that the Convention remains a living instrument that responds to evolving
regional and global understandings of human rights.
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